Wilfried Kuissi Kamdem: Risk sharing and competition in equity-linked insurance: Stackelberg-Nash equilibria with CRRA utility and Epstein-Zin recursive preferences
Time: Tue 2026-11-24 13.15 - 14.15
Location: KTH 3721 (Lindstedtsvägen 25)
Participating: Wilfried Kuissi Kamdem (Uni Freiburg)
Abstract: In this talk we present a hybrid Stackelberg–Nash differential game between a reinsurer and two competing insurers offering equity-linked insurance products, under both constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility and Epstein–Zin recursive preferences. The reinsurer acts as the leader, choosing its consumption–investment strategy and reinsurance safety loadings. The insurers act as followers in a non-zero-sum game, choosing their consumption–investment strategies and reinsurance purchases at the prices set by the reinsurer. Competition enters through relative performance in running consumption and terminal wealth. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to incorporate a Stackelberg structure into a reinsurance game with Epstein–Zin recursive preferences. Using the martingale optimality principle, we derive explicit equilibrium strategies and value functions. We show that reinsurance demand reflects both individual risk assessments and competitive considerations, which can induce insurers to purchase full coverage even at prices above their individual critical thresholds. Finally, we examine the sensitivity of the equilibrium strategies to model parameters for two equity-linked contracts: a European put option and a path-dependent Asian put option. (This is joint work with Olivier Menoukeu Pamen)
