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Nash equilibrium seeking in non-convex multi-player game

Gehui Xu

Abstract: Seeking Nash equilibria (NE) in non-cooperative games has been widely investigated in social sciences and engineering. A strategy profile is called NE if no player can profit from unilaterally deviating from its own strategy. Attributed to the underlying non-convexity in many practical problems such as machine learning sensor localization and energy storage management, obtaining the existence condition of a global NE instead of a local or approximate NE is challenging, let alone designing theoretically guaranteed algorithms.

In this talk, I will present my research work on addressing these challenges. Firstly, I will discuss the existence condition of the global NE by employing the canonical duality theory to deal with the non-convexity in payoff functions. Then I will introduce a conjugate-based ordinary differential equation (ODE) with the assisted complementary dual information to compute the NE. Finally, I will focus on a class of non-convex sensor network localization problems and discuss a distributed implementation to seek NE therein.

Time: Fri 2024-03-01 11.00 - 12.00

Location: Seminar room 3721

Language: English

Participating: Gehui Xu

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Bio: Gehui Xu received the B.Sc. degree in information and computing science from University of Mining and Technology of China, Beijing, China, in 2019. She is currently a Ph.D. candidate in Academy of Mathematics and Systems Science, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, China. She is currently a visiting Ph.D. with the School of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, KTH Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden. Her research interests include game theory and distributed optimization.