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Per Martin-Löf: Logic and ethics

Tid: On 2019-02-27 kl 10.00 - 11.45

Plats: Room 16, building 5, Kräftriket, Department of Mathematics, Stockholm University

Medverkande: Per Martin-Löf

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Abstract: The condition under which it is correct (proper) to make an assertion is that the assertor knows how (is able) to perform the task which constitutes the content of the assertion (correctness condition for assertions).

To make an assertion is to commit (obligate) yourself to performing the task which constitutes the content of the assertion (commitment account of assertion).

The condition under which it is correct (proper) to undertake an obligation (make a commitment) is that the obligor knows how (is able) to fulfil it (ought implies can).

The relation between the preceding three principles is simple: the correctness condition for assertions follows from the commitment account of assertion taken together with the ought implies can principle. Both the commitment account of assertion and the ought implies can principle bring in the notion of duty (obligation) and hence implicitly, by the correlativity of rights and duties, the notion of right. On the other hand, the notions of right and duty are the key notions of deontological ethics. Thus, all in all, logic has, not only an ontological layer and an epistemological layer, but also a deontological layer underlying the epistemological one. It can be avoided only by treating the notion of knowledge how (can) as a primitive notion, thereby abstaining from relating it to the notions of right and duty (may and must).